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Is there a tactile field? 
 
It is commonly acknowledged that there is a significant overlap between the contents of visual 
and tactile experiences. In particular, many objects and their properties may be experienced 
both by using touch and vision. For instance, we may see and also touch a chair, and in doing 
so, each of the modalities can inform us about its features, such as shape or size. Nevertheless, 
even though vision and touch may present the same objects and properties, it seems that in the 
case of each of these modalities the items considered are presented in a significantly different 
way. For example, tactile experiences of external objects are mediated by interoceptive bodily 
sensations; this does not happen in case of visual experiences, which intuitively seem to be 
purely exteroceptive (Martin, 1993; O’Shaughessy, 1989; Ratcliffe, 2008; Richardson, 2011). 
Furthermore, while vision presents spatial properties, such as shape, in a mainly synchronic 
way, the tactile experiences of shape have an important diachronic aspect, as the shape of 
objects is recognized by exploratory activities in which different parts of an object are 
touched at subsequent moments (Fulkerson, 2014; Klatzky & Lederman, 2004; Martin, 1992). 
One of the most important differences concerns the way in which space itself is 
presented in visual and tactile modalities
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. In the case of vision, it is commonly accepted that 
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 I write about ‘presenting space’ in order to stay neutral on the specific theory of perceptual experiences. 
Depending on a theory, experiential space may be treated as a part of representational content, as a part of 
experiential structure, or as a physical object which constitutes perceptual experiences.  
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visual objects are experienced as located in a bounded ‘visual field.’ The character of the 
visual field makes it possible not only to perceive objects as standing in spatial relations, but 
also to experience empty space, which extends between objects, and through which distant 
objects are seen (Mac Cumhaill, 2015; Martin, 1993; Richardson, 2010).  
It is controversial whether similar field-like characteristics can be attributed to the 
space in which tactile objects and tactile sensations are experienced to be located. Some 
authors believe that touch also has abilities to present empty spaces (e.g., Ratcliffe, 2008; Mac 
Cumhaill, 2017; Scott, 2001) and that certain bodily representations provide a foundation for 
locating tactile entities in a field-like space (Cheng, 2019; Cheng & Haggard, 2018; Haggard 
& Giovagnoli, 2011). However, there are also important positions in which the existence of a 
tactile field is denied, for instance due to the diachronic way in which touch operates and 
difficulties in discerning tactile experiences of an empty space from an absence of tactile 
experience (see Martin, 1992; 1993; O’Shaughessy, 1989; Strawson, 1959).  
In the paper, I aim to investigate whether it is justified to postulate that space in which 
tactile objects and tactile sensations are experienced to be located has the form of a field. I 
argue that the answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’. This is so due to the dual nature of touch: touch is 
both an interoceptive modality, which presents states of one’s body, and an exteroceptive 
modality, which presents external entities. I claim that the interoceptive tactile space, in which 
tactile bodily sensations are experienced to be localized, has the character of a spatial field. 
On the other hand, the exteroceptive tactile space, in which external, tactile objects are 
experienced to be localized does not have characteristics necessary for ascribing field status. 
The paper starts (section 1) by explicating the notion of ‘spatial field’. Subsequently, a 
distinction between interoceptive and exteroceptive tactile spaces is introduced in Section 2. 
In Section 3, I argue that the interoceptive space, in which tactile bodily sensations are 
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experienced to be located, has the character of a spatial field. Finally, in Section 4 I argue that 
the analogous conclusion is not justified in the case of exteroceptive tactile space.  
 
1. Types of spatial representations 
 
There are at least three, nonexclusive types of perceptual spatial representations. First, a 
perceptual modality may present the spatial properties of some entities. For instance, vision 
presents objects as having certain shapes and sizes. Second, a perceptual modality may 
present spatial relations between perceived entities or between perceived entities and a 
subject. Finally, it may be perceptually presented that perceived entities are located in a 
spatial field. When one visually perceives two objects positioned at some distance from each 
other, these objects are not only experienced as standing in a spatial relation, but also as 
localized within a space designated by the boundaries of our visual field, and as separated by, 
also visually presented, some empty locations positioned between them. 
As shown by the visual examples above, a single perceptual modality can exhibit 
various abilities for forming spatial representations: it can present the spatial properties of 
entities, present entities as standing in spatial relations, and present them as located in a 
spatial field. However, this is not universally the case, as some modalities may have more 
restricted abilities for spatial representation. For instance, while it is plausible that audition 
presents entities as standing in egocentric spatial relations, like being to the right of the 
subject, it is less likely that audition presents entities as positioned within some sort of 
auditory spatial field (see O‘Callaghan, 2008; O’Shaughnessy, 2009; Nudds, 2009 for various 
positions on auditory spatial representation).  
The question of whether tactile entities are presented in a way that allows us to speak 
about a tactile field is controversial within the philosophical literature (Cheng & Haggard, 
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2018; Martin, 1992; 1993; Scott, 2001). The first step required to resolve this issue is to 
provide a more precise characteristic of properties which distinguish spatial fields from other 
types of spatial representations. As an example, let’s consider an ordinary visual experience in 
which two circular objects are presented as positioned at some distance from each other. The 
main intuition concerning the presence of a visual field is that such objects are not presented 
merely as having spatial properties and as standing in spatial relations, but are presented as 
positioned within a topologically connected space with a roughly conical shape. This space 
seems to constitute a ‘container’ or ‘form’ (see Cheng, 2019) in which perceived objects are 
located, and which remains structurally unchanged despite the appearances and 
disappearances of objects, as well as modifications of their spatial arrangement. In other 
words, the presence of a visual field is a structural feature of visual experiences which 
remains the same no matter what arrangement of objects is perceived (see Richardson, 2010)
2
.  
Topological connectedness means that there is a path composed of locations between 
each two places within the visual field, such that each element of the path is spatially 
connected to the previous element. In other words, there is a possibility of reaching, by 
spatially continuous movement, any location within the visual field from any other location 
within it, without crossing its borders. I believe that topological connectedness is one of the 
crucial characteristics of spatial fields. Due to its presence the perceived items are not only 
experienced as being at some distance, but also as separated by a path of connected, or 
overlapping, locations (which may be empty or occupied by some other items). Without 
topological connectedness, it would be difficult to maintain the intuition that a spatial field is 
a common ‘container’ which encompasses presented entities. Thus, I assume the following 
topological connectedness rule: 
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 This is not to deny that there are disorders, such as Bálint's syndrome or tunnel vision, which may lead to visual 




(Topological Connectedness) If a perceptual modality presents entities as located in a spatial 
field, then it presents them as located in a topologically connected space. 
 
The second crucial characteristic of visual field is that its topological structure is 
independent from experienced patterns of spatial relations between perceived entities. For 
instance, in the case of vision, one may initially experience an object A at some distance from 
an object B, then an object C may appear, which also stands at some distance and direction 
from A and B, and finally objects A and B may disappear, and only object C remain. However, 
despite these changes in spatial relations, the topological structure of the visual field remains 
unchanged. In particular, it is not the case that visual objects are presented as located in a 
topologically connected space only when some specific arrangement of visual entities is 
perceived. I believe that such ‘relation independence’ is another necessary characteristic of a 
spatial field. Without satisfying this condition, the spatial field would not be a ‘container’ in 
which various spatial arrangements of entities may be located, but instead, its structural 
features would rely on certain arrangements of entities. This condition is expressed by the 
following rule: 
 
(Relation Independence) If a perceptual modality presents entities as located in a spatial 
field, then the topological structure of space in which entities are presented as located is the 
same no matter the experienced spatial relations concerning the presented entities. 
 
The third essential characteristic of spatial field is the possibility of empty locations, 
i.e. such locations which are not occupied by any presented entity. When we perceive objects 
positioned within visual field, we may also perceive that there are some empty spaces 
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between spatially related objects, or empty locations between objects’ positions and our 
location. If a perceptual modality is not able to present empty locations, again, space would 
not be presented as an independent ‘container’ in which objects are located, but rather as a 
spatial arrangement of some entities. Because of that, I postulate the following Possible 
Emptiness rule: 
 
(Possible Emptiness) If a perceptual modality presents entities as located in a spatial field, 
then it presents them as located in a space which may contain empty locations. 
 
I treat the three above necessary rules as jointly sufficient for perceptually presenting 
entities as located in a spatial field. This means that a spatial field is a space which is a 
topologically connected arrangement of places such that its structure is not modified by 
changes concerning spatial relations between entities, and which may contain empty 
locations. By using the rules above, we may formulate a criterion that must be satisfied by a 
perceptual modality in order to present entities as located in a spatial field: 
 
(Spatial Field) A perceptual modality presents entities as located in a spatial field if and only 
if (a) it presents them as located in a topologically connected space, (b) the topological 
structure of space in which entities are presented to be located is the same no matter the 
experienced spatial relations concerning the presented entities, and (c) it presents them as 
located in a space which may contain empty locations. 
 
The above characteristic of the spatial field is able to explicate the main metaphor, 
according to which, spatial field is a ‘container’ or a ‘form’ in which some entities may be 
presented. A container constitutes a topologically connected space; it provides a stable 
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structure in which various arrangements of entities may be located, and some of its parts may 
be empty. Furthermore, the proposed characteristic grasps the major, intuitive features of the 
visual field which is a paradigmatic example of the perceptual spatial field. In visual space, 
each location is connected with every other location by a possibly empty spatial path, such 
that an entity may travel between any fragments of the visual field in a continuous fashion. 
Furthermore, we do not experience visual space undergoing any structural modifications 
when perceived objects change their positions and relational arrangements.   
I assume that the above characteristics of visual field are perceptually presented in 
experiences. Alternatively, one may oppose that assumption by providing a distinct account, 
according to which what is presented are objects standing in spatial relations and field-like 
characteristics are recognized in virtue of post-perceptual, propositional states (see Mac 
Cumhaill, 2015 for considerations regarding this view). While the detailed discussion cannot 
be accommodated within this paper, I believe, following Richardson (2010), that there are 
reasons to accept that there is a perceptual phenomenal character concerning field-like visual 
space. First, visually perceiving empty fragments of visual field is distinct from the lack of a 
visual experience. For instance, we do not have any visual experience of space behind our 
head, but there is some way in which empty locations within the visual field look to us. 
Second, there is a phenomenal difference between seeing whether visual space extending 
between two objects is empty or occupied by other items. The presence of this difference 
suggests that there is some phenomenal character connected with experiencing empty visual 
space. 
In empirical literature (in particular, see Haggard & Giovagnoli, 2011), the notion of 
tactile, spatial field is introduced mainly to explain the ability to recognize patterns of 
relations between tactile sensations. Such patterns are static, so are recognized without the 
help of temporal factors, and are big enough such that their elements are present in non-
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overlapping receptive fields of tactile receptors. The notion of spatial field introduced above 
can account for the perception of such patterns, because the presence of topologically 
connected and structurally stable space allows for simultaneously presenting that there are 
several elements occupying spatial locations and standing in certain spatial relations, for 
instance concerning distance. Nevertheless, in Section 3 I argue, contrary to what is often 
postulated in empirical and philosophical works, that the ability to recognize tactile patterns is 
not sufficient as a justification of the presence of a tactile field.    
Later, I argue that the Spatial Field criterion is satisfied in the case of the tactile 
interoceptive space, but not the tactile exteroceptive space. 
 
2. Interoceptive and exteroceptive tactile spaces 
 
In my understanding of touch, I follow those authors who characterize it as a complex 
modality that uses a variety of data, in particular, that provided by cutaneous, kinesthetic, and 
proprioceptive mechanisms (e.g., Fulkerson, 2011; Lederman & Klatzky, 2009; 
O’Shaughnessy, 1989; 1998; Ratcliffe, 2012). This diversity of information, in important part 
gathered through active exploration of the environment, is what allows touch to form 
elaborate representations of external objects.  
A commonly recognized aspect of tactile modality is its bipolar exteroceptive and 
interoceptive character (e.g., Mattens, 2013; 2016; Ratcliffe, 2008; Richardson, 2011). This 
bipolarity means that tactile perceptual states usually present something about external entities 
(exteroceptive aspect) and about states of one’s body (interoceptive aspect). For instance, in a 
tactile experience related to the act of holding a ball, an external object is presented as a 
common subject of various features such as hardness, roughness, size, and shape (Fulkerson, 
2011; 2014). Simultaneously, such an experience has also an interoceptive aspect, as it 
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presents that there is pressure applied on surface of the hand, and that the hand is in a 
particular position. In fact, it is often claimed that the exteroceptive tactile perception of 
objects is mediated by interoceptive tactile bodily sensations (Martin, 1993). For instance, the 
phenomenal character of tactile bodily sensations may be such that it implies the presence of 
an external entity (e.g., a sensation of pressure implies that something applies this pressure, 
see Richardson, 2011) and it may mirror the properties of external entities such as their shape 
(e.g., we may experience a pressure sensation as located in a circular fragment of skin, see 
Martin, 1992).  
The dual character of touch has also an implication for the way in which tactile entities 
are spatially represented. First, tactile space may be understood as an exteroceptive space in 
which external entities, such as a held ball, are experienced to be located. However, tactile 
space may also be understood as an interoceptive bodily space in which tactile bodily 
sensations are experienced to be positioned. Here again, I understand tactile spaces in a broad 
way, as constructed using various sensory data involving cutaneous, kinesthetic, and 
proprioceptive information. However, this is not to deny that even mechanisms processing 
merely cutaneous information may allow for formation of elaborate tactile spatial 
representations (see Cheng, 2019; Haggard et al., 2017). 
To illustrate the difference between exteroceptive and interoceptive tactile spaces, let’s 
consider two tactile experiences. The first experience, “Short,” is an experience as of holding 
a short stick between the thumb and index finger. The second, “Long,” is an experience as of 
holding a longer stick between those fingers, such that the thumb and index finger are 
significantly further apart. Other factors relevant for tactile perception, like the current 
position of various body parts, are the same in both Short and Long.  
Experiences Short and Long have an exteroceptive spatial aspect: they present sticks 
as positioned in space extending beyond the bodily boundaries. However, each of these 
10 
 
experiences presents the ends of a stick as located in different parts of the external space. It is 
so because in Short, the ends of a stick are positioned closer to each other than in Long. This 
point is particularly apparent if one considers a transition from Short to Long, as would occur 
if the stick expanded and pushed the fingers further apart. After the extension, the endings of 
a stick would be experienced as located in different places than their initial positions. This 
shows that exteroceptive touch utilizes some form of an external reference frame. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether such a spatial frame is merely relational, such that only 
relations between body parts and touched objects are represented, or whether it is a genuine, 
topologically connected spatial field. 
Apart from the exteroceptive aspects, both Short and Long have also an interoceptive 
spatial aspect: they present tactile bodily sensations on index finger and thumb. In one sense, 
these sensations are also presented as located in the external space, roughly in places in which 
fingers are positioned. However, in another sense, which is the one relevant here, the 
sensations considered are presented as located in the interoceptive, bodily space determined 
by the stable structure of the body. In the case of this interoceptive bodily space, the presented 
locations of sensations are the same no matter whether we consider Short or Long. Both 
experiences present a sensation on an index finger and a sensation on a thumb that are 
spatially separated by the same bodily fragment, encompassing the fingers considered and 
part of the hand. Using the terminology introduced by Bermúdez (1998, pp. 154-161), we 
may state that the locations of tactile sensations in interoceptive space are ‘A-locations.’ 
Spatial relations between such locations are not affected by the current position of body parts, 
but rather, are determined by the stable way in which body is divided into parts by joints.
3
 In 
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 Bermúdez contrasts A-location with B-locations which are determined by the current relational arrangement of 
the body. For instance, a tactile sensation on a foot has differing B-locations depending on whether a leg is 
straight or bent. 
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contrast to the case of exteroceptive touch, in which some external frame of reference is 
utilized, interoceptive space of bodily sensations is organized according to a somatotopic 
frame determined by relations between skin fragments and stable, structural organization of 
the body. However, it may still be asked whether such interoceptive space possesses the 
crucial characteristics of a spatial field. 
This above differences intuitively shows that the exteroceptive space in which tactile 
objects are presented and the interoceptive space of tactile sensations are not the same and 
may have distinct properties. Later, I argue that only interoceptive space has the characteristic 
of a spatial field. It should be noted that I do not aim to identify interoceptive tactile space and 
exteroceptive tactile space with any particular representation postulated within psychological 
works (see Carruthers, 2008; Longo, 2016; Longo et al., 2015 for reviews). Instead, both the 
exteroceptive space of tactile objects and the interoceptive space of tactile sensations seem to 
rely on various types of information gathered by different types of receptors and stored in 
multiple bodily representations (see further sections for details). 
 
3. Interoceptive tactile space as a spatial field  
 
There is little doubt that tactile bodily sensations are presented as having certain spatial 
properties. For instance, they can be experienced as having a certain bodily location, size, and 
shape (Mattens, 2016; O’Shaughessy, 1989). Furthermore, tactile bodily sensations can mirror 
some of the spatial properties of touched objects. According to some authors (see Martin, 
1992; Richardson, 2011), this feature allows tactile bodily sensations to mediate exteroceptive 
touch. Similarly, it is plausible to assume that we are presented with spatial relations between 
tactile bodily sensations. In particular, there are studies showing that tactile bodily sensations 
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are experienced as positioned at some distance (see Haggard et al., 2017; Longo & Golubova, 
2017) and in some direction from each other (see Haggard & Giovagnoli, 2011).
 4
  
One may doubt whether the ability to recognize relations between tactile sensations is 
a genuine perceptual phenomenon and does not result from post-perceptual judgments 
combining sensory information about bodily location of sensations with general knowledge 
about the structure and size of the body. I believe that there are three reasons why this option 
is less likely. First, researchers have identified various biases affecting assessments of spatial 
relations.  For instance, the distance between tactile bodily sensations seems larger when each 
sensation is localized on a different body part separated by a joint (de Vignemont et al., 2009). 
However, it is not clear why such bias should occur in the case of a post-perceptual judgment, 
as our propositional knowledge about bodily structure does not suggest that joints somehow 
increase the distance between skin fragments. Second, in studies concerning interoceptive 
tactile spatial relations, stimuli are often applied in proximity, on the same body part (e.g., 
several centimeters from each other, see Mancini et al., 2014). Nevertheless, our post-
perceptual knowledge about the body seems to be quite abstract such, that it contains 
information regarding the body parts that are connected and approximate distance between 
distinct body parts, but it does not seem to specify what is the distance between some 
unremarkable proximal skin fragments. Third, adaptation aftereffects concerning spatial 
relations between tactile sensations have been discovered and their presence suggests such 
spatial relations are computed at early stages of sensory processing relying on local, 
cutaneous data (see Calzolari et al., 2017). 
                                                          
4
 Nevertheless, this is not to deny that there are certain respects in which tactile bodily sensations can be 
characterized as non-spatial (see Matthen, 2021). For instance, a tactile sensation extending from groin to foot 
may not inform about the spatial relations between parts of a leg. 
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It is far more controversial whether tactile bodily sensations are presented in a space 
having the characteristics of a spatial field, i.e., whether that they are presented as located in 
topologically connected space whose fragments can be empty and whose structure remains 
the same no matter the relationship between the sensations experienced. For instance, Martin 
has argued against the presence of an interoceptive tactile field by stating that touch 
represents objects located outside bodily boundaries, and bodily space is not experienced as 
empty but as occupied by a particular object—the body itself (Martin, 1993). However, such a 
conviction seems to underestimate the interoceptive aspect of touch in virtue of which the 
body is not one of the presented objects, but rather, is the space in which bodily sensations are 
located.  
Furthermore, Martin (1992) has proposed that tactile space is not a field because touch 
cannot, in opposition to vision, presents the space extending between experienced entities. In 
contrast, some authors claim that interoceptive bodily space has the form of a field, as there 
are tactile experiences in which one experiences not only spatial relations between sensations 
but also the empty space between them (see Ratcliffe, 2008; Mac Cumhaill, 2017; Scott, 2001 
for various examples). For instance, it seems that when having an experience caused by a 
brush moved against the skin, one experiences not only pressure sensations caused by bristles, 
but also that there is no sensation between them. However, such examples do not show that 
the perceptual space of tactile bodily sensations is relation independent, i.e., that it is 
structurally the same no matter of the presented spatial relations between sensations. It is so 
because the examples provided concern cases in which one experiences empty tactile places 
given the presence of specific spatial arrangements of tactile sensations.  
More recently, the idea of the interoceptive tactile field was argued for by referring to 
the notion of ‘skin-space’ and to experiments concerning the tactile path integration, i.e., an 
ability to recognize the middle spatial position between the start and end point of a tactile 
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stimulation (see Cheng, 2019; Fardo et al., 2018; Haggard & Giovagnoli, 2011; Haggard et 
al., 2017). Skin-space is a low-level bodily representation whose structure is determined 
solely by the arrangement of the receptive fields of tactile receptors positioned on the skin’s 
surface (see Cheng & Haggard, 2018, p. 61). It is postulated that skin-space allows the 
perception of spatial relations between tactile sensations as, for instance, distance between 
sensations can be computed relying on the number of receptive fields separating the points of 
tactile stimulation. Studies concerning skin-space are relevant for the investigations of the 
interoceptive tactile field, since participants in such studies are usually asked not to report the 
spatial structure of an external stimulus but the pattern of relations between sensations within 
a bodily framework. 
However, these recent defenses of the interoceptive tactile field have three limitations. 
First, an intuitive understanding of the spatial field was used, without explicitly characterizing 
how the spatial field is different from other spatial representations. Second, the authors have 
focused on the fact that tactile perception is able to compute spatial relations between bodily 
sensations (Cheng, 2019, pp. 235-237; Cheng, 2020; Cheng & Haggard, 2018, pp. 62-63; 
Fardo et al., 2018, p. 101; Haggard & Giovagnoli, 2011). However, such a conclusion is too 
weak, as entities may be represented as standing in spatial relations without representing them 
as located within a spatial field. In particular, Martin, in his classic critiques of the notion of 
‘tactile field,’ did not deny that touch is able to represent spatial relations. However, he 
believes the mere ability to represent spatial relations provides only an ‘etiolated’ concept of 
the spatial field (Martin, 1992, p. 208). Instead, he focused on the fact that tactile modality, 
differently than vision, does not represent space between spatially related items (see Martin, 
1992, pp. 203, 205-208, and Martin, 1993 for an example of a climber who touches several 
points of a wall). Third, defenses relaying on the notion of ‘skin-space’ have mainly 
concerned the way in which tactile mechanisms process sensory information. However, even 
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if sensory information is processed in the way characteristic for a spatial field, it does not 
automatically entail that the crucial spatial characteristics are presented in tactile experiences. 
Below, I argue in three steps that interoceptive tactile space has characteristics of a 
spatial field. In the first step, I characterize selected bodily representations in virtue of which 
tactile sensations are presented as having a spatial localization. Subsequently, I show that the 
relevant bodily representations have features characteristic of spatial fields. Finally, I argue 
that these features are phenomenally presented in interoceptive tactile experiences. More 
specifically, I focus on two bodily representations: (a) skin-space, which represents the body 
relying on the layout of cutaneous receptors (e.g., Cheng & Haggard, 2018; Fardo et al., 2018) 
and (b) a stable, off-line body schema, which represents the body as a structure made of parts 
connected by joints (e.g., Hochstetter, 2016; Longo & Haggard, 2010; de Vignemont, 2010). I 
do not claim that these are the only representations which are relevant for presenting tactile 
bodily sensations as spatially located. In particular, a ‘superficial schema’ is proposed which 
is a representation whose function is to allow localization of tactile sensations on the skin’s 
surface and so it seems to serve a similar role to that of skin-space (see Head & Holmes, 1911 
for a classic source regarding superficial schema and Longo, 2016 for a contemporary 
review). However, because discussions concerning tactile field usually refer to the skin-space, 
I am focusing on this notion. 
 
3.1 Skin-space and stable body schema 
 
Intuitively, it seems that tactile bodily sensations are experienced as positioned at some places 
on the body’s surface. For instance, we may simultaneously experience a tactile sensation on 
the forearm and on the arm above the elbow. This happens due to the functioning of bodily 
representations, which usually, but not always (as strikingly demonstrated by the example of 
16 
 
phantom limbs), allow for sensations to be presented as positioned within the boundaries of 
the actual body. As noted above, one of such representations is skin-space which is 
determined by the array of tactile receptors covering the skin (Cheng & Haggard, 2018; Fardo 
et al., 2018). The information provided by the array of skin receptors allow, inter alia, 
recognition that some tactile sensations are closer to or further from each other depending on 
the amount of skin separating them (Haggard & Giovagnoli, 2011). These distances are 
established largely independent from the current position of body parts, as the layout of 
receptors between those which receive tactile stimulation remains the same no matter how the 
body is positioned. Earlier, when comparing interoceptive aspects of experiences Short and 
Long, I noted that there is a sense in which locations of tactile sensations remain the same no 
matter whether fingers are closer to or further from each. This important feature, characteristic 
for interoceptive tactile space, is likely to be at least partially provided by skin-space.  
While skin-space, due to its high ‘resolution’ provided by the dense array of cutaneous 
receptors, may provide detailed information about the location of sensations on the skin and 
the distance between them, it does not allow, unless supplemented information from other 
representations, recognition of the body part in which a sensation occurs, and whether two 
sensations are located in the same body part (Cheng & Haggard, 2018; de Vignemont et al., 
2006; de Vignemont, 2017). This is because skin-space provides information about 
arrangement of skin fragments, for instance that a fragment A is in distance D from a fragment 
B, but does not contain information whether, between A and B, a border between bodily parts 
is present. In consequence, additional information is required to recognize, for instance, that 
one sensation is below the elbow and second above it. In particular, due to the fact that the 
structure of interoceptive tactile space is independent from the current bodily posture, the 
major role in experiencing that a sensation in present in the particular body part seems to be 
played by the stable, off-line body schema (de Vignemont & Massin, 2013; de Vignemont, 
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2014). This bodily representation provide data about the general division of body into parts, 
for instance that hand is separated from forearm by wrist no matter whether wrist is bend or 
not. In case of the Short and Long experiences, the stable body schema allows representation 
of the fact that one tactile sensation is on the index finger, the second on the thumb, and that 
they are separated by a certain fragment of the hand.  
It should be noted that the usage of terminology concerning bodily representations is 
not uniform across the literature. For instance, in some works the term ‘body image’ is also 
used to name a structural representation of a body (see O’Shaughessy, 1998). Hence, for the 
sake of clarity, I adopt a convention whereby ‘body schema’ means a representation which 
presents a body as a structure made of parts standing in spatial relations (Hochstetter, 2016; 
Longo & Haggard, 2010; de Vignemont, 2010). May authors introduce, in addition to the off-
line body schema, a short-term or on-line body schema which represents the way body parts 
are positioned at a given moment (Carruthers, 2008; O’Shaughessy, 1989; Proske & 
Gandevia, 2012). It is also generally agreed that the information provided by both off-line and 
on-line body schemas are crucial in conducting bodily actions. 
The fact that tactile bodily sensations are localized by using skin-space and the stable 
body schema already suggests that such sensations are presented as located in some space 
whose structure is determined by pattern of skin-receptors and the way in which body is 
divided into parts. However, it is not yet clear whether these bodily representations have 
properties which allow for presenting tactile bodily sensations as located in a space with the 
crucial characteristics of a spatial field.  
 




As proposed earlier, a perceptually presented space is a spatial field if and only if (a) it is 
topologically connected, (b) its structure is independent from the pattern of spatial relations 
between presented entities, and (c) it can contain empty locations. 
Let’s start from considering the first characteristic: topological connectedness. This 
feature is explicitly present in the case of skin-space, as it represents the body as relying on 
the pattern of receptors covering the skin (see Longo & Golubova, 2017 for a 
conceptualization in terms of a 2D array of pixels). In consequence, the body model provided 
by the skin-space has the form of a topologically connected surface such that each pair of 
locations is connected by some spatial path. The stable body schema also has properties that 
support presenting tactile bodily sensations within a topologically connected space. It is so 
because stable body schema models body as a structure of topologically connected parts. For 
instance, it represents that a finger is connected to a hand, a hand is connected to a forearm, 
etc., such that it provides information about a spatial path which leads from one body part to 
another (e.g., de Vignemont, 2017; de Vignemont et al., 2009). 
The second characteristic of spatial fields, i.e. relation independence, is also supported 
by both of the representations considered. The topological structure of the skin-space is 
determined by the positions of skin receptors, and so stays the same no matter which receptors 
receive stimulation at a given moment and regardless of the spatial relations between 
stimulated receptors. Similarly, the structure of the stable bodily schema is determined by the 
way in which fragments of the body are connected by joints and is not influenced by the 
current pattern of tactile stimulation within bodily parts. 
The situation is no different when the final characteristic of spatial field is considered: 
the possibility of empty locations. In particular, the structure of skin-space is determined by 
the array of receptors, no matter their current activities. Thus, the skin-space can model the 
body as a space containing places in which no tactile stimulation is present. Analogously, in 
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the case of the stable body schema, the structure of body parts is represented no matter 
whether there is some tactile stimulation affecting these parts.  
Nevertheless, even if the properties of skin-space and the stable body schema support 
characterizing interoceptive tactile space as a spatial field, one may still argue that these 
properties are not reflected within the structure of a conscious tactile experience. In particular, 
it is possible that by using bodily representations interoceptive tactile space is represented in a 
field-like way only on a subpersonal level. For instance, in considerations regarding the body 
schema, authors often mention that such bodily representation is only peripherally present in 
consciousness and is mainly used in navigating actions (see Elder, 2013; Hochstetter, 2016; 
Kinsbourne, 1995).  
 
3.3 Spatial field and tactile experience 
 
The doubt introduced above can be specified in two main ways. First, it can be postulated that 
the bodily space in which interoceptive tactile sensations are positioned is not perceptually 
experienced at all. Using a visual analogy, experiencing space between tactile bodily 
sensations is not like experiencing a part of visual field between two objects but like visually 
experiencing the space behind our head—there is simply no such experience. Second, one 
may claim that while interoceptive tactile space is perceptually presented, it is not presented 
as having the characteristics of a spatial field. 
I believe that there are important reasons for refuting such worries. First, interoceptive 
tactile space seems to have boundaries. Our bodily representations present the body as a 
region in which tactile sensations may occur in opposition to regions, outside presented bodily 
boundaries, in which such sensations cannot be felt (see Martin, 1992; 1993). Thus, it is 
difficult to maintain that the bodily space of tactile sensations is not experienced at all, as it is 
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at least experienced as a region of possible tactile sensations in opposition to other spatial 
regions. 
Furthermore, there are psychological results suggesting that not only is interoceptive 
tactile space perceptually presented, but it is presented as having characteristics important for 
field-status. In particular, such reasons are provided by studies concerning tactile path 
integration (see Fardo et al., 2018). In these studies, a continuous, moving tactile stimulus is 
applied, such that a participant has a tactile sensation starting at one bodily point and moving 
towards a spatially separated bodily point along an S-shaped path. The task of participant is to 
point to the bodily location positioned midway between the starting and ending points. Due to 
the curved path of stimulus motion, this mid-point does not receive tactile stimulation.  
While the locations chosen by the participants is not exactly the middle location 
between the starting and ending points, as the responses are biased toward the S-shaped path, 
the experiment demonstrates that people succeed in choosing a non-stimulated location lying 
in proximity to the mid-point. I believe that such results have important implications. While, 
of course, behavioral data do not provide any direct access to experiential phenomenology, it 
is plausible to assume that participants rely on the phenomenal character of their tactile 
experience in order to choose the proper bodily location. In consequence, the phenomenal 
character of an experience should be such that it allows participants to be quite successful in 
the path integration tasks. First, the results of the considered study suggest that people not 
only experience tactile bodily sensations as positioned in some spatial relationships, but also 
as separated by some continuous space. As a result, they do not merely refer to relative 
distance or direction between points, but can point out a bodily location between them.  
Furthermore, the space between two points should be presented as topologically 
connected, because in order to identify a location close to the mid-point one has to recognize 
that there are spatial paths connecting locations of felt sensations. Second, because a location 
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close to the mid-point can be identified while not being tacitly stimulated, it seems that one 
can experience an empty fragment of bodily space. Third, it does not seem that the changing 
relationship between sensations modifies the experienced topological structure of 
interoceptive tactile space. In particular, there are many distinct tactile paths—with greater or 
smaller curvature—which, despite differences in spatial characteristics, have the same mid-
point between their starting and ending location. Nevertheless, the varying spatial relations 
between fragments of such paths do not prevent people from pointing to a location close to 
the same mid-point. It suggests that the experiential structure of space remains the same 
regardless of the changing relational characteristics.  
Data from path integration studies are not the only evidence for the conclusions above. 
Another piece of evidence comes from the presence of interoceptive, spatial tactile attention 
(see Spence & Gallace, 2007 for a review). A person is able to focus attention on a bodily 
fragment in which no tactile sensation is felt, and in consequence, sensations which 
subsequently appear in the attended part are processed more efficiently. In addition, such 
attention is not only exogenous but also endogenous, i.e., a person may voluntarily choose the 
bodily fragment to which they attend. It is an analogous perceptual ability to the case of visual 
spatial attention, which can be focused not only on visible objects, but also on fragments of 
space (see Scholl, 2001). 
The presence of tactile spatial attention, which is both interoceptive and endogenous, 
additionally suggests that the bodily space of tactile sensations is somehow experientially 
presented. In fact, if there were no experiences of interoceptive tactile space, we would be 
unable to endogenously focus attention on its fragments, just as we are unable to focus visual 
attention on locations outside the visual field. Furthermore, it is likely that, as a result of an 
attentional focus, some characteristics of bodily space are experientially presented, because 
attending to an element is usually associated with an occurrence of a phenomenal character 
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presenting the properties of an attended thing (see Boxtel et al., 2010 for a review, in fact, 
some authors propose a stronger thesis that attention is necessary and sufficient for conscious 
experience, see Prinz, 2000). In particular, bodily fragments selected by tactile attention tend 
to be topologically connected; for instance, attention can be focused on one of the hands (e.g., 
Forster & Eimer, 2005). In addition, due to the endogenous aspect of tactile attention, it can 
be focused on bodily fragments free of any tactile sensations (e.g., Lakatos & Shepard, 1997). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the topological structure of attended fragments depends 
in any way on the relationship between perceived tactile sensations. It rather seems that 
endogenous tactile attention can select a bodily fragment, and then various patterns of 
sensations can be experienced as located within the structurally same fragment. Again, such 
properties suggest that the interoceptive bodily space is experientially presented as a spatial 
field.  
An additional question is how to precisely characterize the relation between attention 
and experiential presence of the tactile field (or its fragments). A strong thesis that tactile field 
is experienced even pre-attentively may be proposed, but focusing attention makes its 
phenomenal presence more vivid and allows for more fine-grained spatial discriminations. 
However, a weaker thesis is also available stating that focusing attention is necessary for 
experiencing bodily space as a tactile field. Here, I do not attempt to determine the option that 
is more plausible, since both are coherent with the main thesis that interoceptive tactile space 
is experienced as having field-like characteristics.    
Despite the behavioral evidence presented above, one may still argue that phenomenal 
character of interoceptive tactile space is so impoverished that we should refute the idea that 
such space is experienced as a spatial field. For instance, it is not clear that there is any 
positive experiential quality we feel in parts of interoceptive bodily space in which no tactile 
sensations are currently present. Furthermore, many locations within this space are not clearly 
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separated by any experienced boundaries. Overall, a common conviction is that bodily space 
is only peripherally present in conscious experiences unless attention is focused on a bodily 
part or the functioning of bodily representations is somehow disrupted (e.g., Hochstetter, 
2016). 
However, such observations are also largely true about the phenomenal character of 
visually presented space. In particular, the empty space between visually presented objects or 
between objects and the observer does not have any vivid positive quality. Similarly, 
fragments of empty visual space are not clearly differentiated from each other by some 
experiential borders. Furthermore, a common intuition concerning the transparency of visual 
experiences suggests that what is phenomenally presented in such experiences are external 
objects and the surrounding space has a much weaker phenomenal presence (e.g., Martin, 
2002). Thus, the phenomenology of visually presented space is sometimes characterized as 
“see-through” phenomenology, to indicate that visually presented locations are not as 
phenomenally salient as visually presented objects (see Mac Cumhaill, 2015). These 
similarities between the phenomenal character of visual space, which is commonly 
characterized as a spatial field, and interoceptive tactile space suggest that the peripheral 
phenomenal character of interoceptive bodily space is not a strong reason to deny it the status 
of a spatial field. Quite the contrary; such phenomenal character may be typical of 
perceptually presented empty space.  
The considerations outlined above show that tactile bodily sensations are presented as 
located due to the functioning of bodily representations that possess characteristics crucial for 
field-status. Furthermore, there are data suggesting that these crucial characteristics are 
reflected in the conscious, interoceptive tactile experiences. Thus, it is plausible to accept that 




4. Exteroceptive tactile space 
 
While there are strong reasons for characterizing interoceptive tactile space as a spatial field, 
the same is not true of exteroceptive tactile space. Exteroceptive space is not the bodily space 
in which tactile sensations are experienced, but one in which external tactile items are 
presented to be located. For instance, in our example concerning experiences Short and Long, 
the tactile sensations on fingers are experienced as located within interoceptive bodily space 
but the held stick is experienced as located outside bodily boundaries, between the fingers. 
Below, I consider the major ideas present in empirical literature concerning the mechanisms 
involved in the perception of exteroceptive tactile space, and I argue that the way in which 
external tactile objects are spatially presented does not support the interpretation of 
exteroceptive tactile space as a spatial field.  
The tactile perception of external objects is mainly achieved through haptics, i.e., by 
active exploration of the environment by using the hands, a process which provides both 
cutaneous and kinesthetic information (Fulkerson, 2014; Klatzky & Lederman, 2004). 
Cutaneous data are provided by the skin receptors, which are affected by the external objects. 
Thus, exteroceptive touch partially relies on the same representations as interoceptive touch 
(see Cheng, 2019). For instance, a bodily representation such as skin-space may be helpful in 
determining where external objects are touching the body. Kinesthetic information concerns 
the current positions of bodily parts and allow determination—as in experiences Short and 
Long—of the size of touched items, and of their other spatial properties such as volume, 
shape or pattern of contours (Fulkerson, 2011; Lederman & Klatzky, 2009). In consequence, 
unlike the case of interoceptive touch, exteroceptive touch relies more heavily not on a stable 
body schema, but on the on-line body schema representing the actual positions of body parts 
(Carruthers, 2008; O’Shaughnessy, 1998; de Vignemont, 2014; de Vignemont et al., 2006). In 
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particular, information about the spatial properties of external objects is mainly obtained by 
relying on current relations between hands and fingers and not on the stable topological 
relations between bodily fragments. In fact, there is a variety of empirical studies 
demonstrating abilities in perceiving spatial properties and relations in virtue of haptics. For 
instance, haptic information allows recognizing distance between surfaces (Gepsthein & 
Banks, 2003), perceiving curvature (van der Horst et al., 2008), drawing shapes in empty 
space using hand movements (Vivani et al., 1997), and grasping objects without help from 
vision (Baud-Bovy & Vivani, 1998; Darling & Miller, 1993). Various diachronic patterns of 
movements by which exteroceptive cutaneous and kinesthetic information is gathered are 
known as exploratory procedures. Psychological investigations have established that different 
exploratory procedures are suited for gaining information about certain properties (Klatzky & 
Lederman, 2004). For instance, enclosing an object in a hand provides data about its volume 
and general shape, while tracking contours using a finger allows recognition of details of its 
boundaries.  
Haptics, by using cutaneous and kinesthetic information, allows the representation of 
external objects as instantiating a variety of tactile properties. Nevertheless, it is still a 
question whether haptically represented objects are represented as positioned in a spatial field. 
Below, I consider three ways in which one may attempt to justify that there is a spatial field 
containing external tactile object. First, it may be proposed that cutaneous information is 
sufficient to present tactile objects as positioned in an exteroceptive tactile field. Second, I 
consider whether this result can be obtained by using both cutaneous and kinesthetic data. 
Third, one may claim that the thesis concerning the presence of an exteroceptive spatial field 
can be justified by referring to the notion of peripersonal space. I argue that none of these 




4.1 Cutaneous information and exteroceptive space 
 
Let’s start by considering the way in which cutaneous information can contribute to 
representing exteroceptive tactile space. As an example, we can consider an experience 
caused by pressing a ring-shaped object to the skin. Such an experience is not solely an 
interoceptive tactile sensation but is also an exteroceptive experience, presenting that there is 
something in the space outside the body. By obtaining cutaneous data, and by utilizing the 
fact that properties of tactile bodily sensations can reflect the properties of external objects 
(Martin, 1992; Richardson, 2011), tactile perception may represent the item touching the skin 
as a common subject of various spatial properties such as shape and size. Furthermore, it 
seems that by detecting a lack of stimulation beyond the outer and inner boundaries of the 
ring, the exteroceptive touch may represent that some fragments of external space are empty, 
as there is no stimulation from some regions proximal to the skin’s surface. However, 
processing cutaneous data does not provide information about the topological structure of 
external space in which the tactile objects are positioned. In particular, data gathered by skin 
receptors allow recognition of the arrangement of surfaces influencing the body but do not 
convey information regarding how the space extending beyond the bodily boundaries is 
organized. In the case of interoceptive tactile space, its topological structure was, in important 
respects, determined by the array of skin-receptors. Nevertheless, when applied to 
exteroceptive space, information obtained by skin-receptors is not sufficient for determining 
its topological structure, as the structure of exteroceptive space is not a bodily structure, but 
the structure of space outside the body. 
 




Of course, in usual situations the exteroceptive tactile perception utilizes not only static 
cutaneous data but also relies on kinesthetic data and engages in dynamic exploratory 
procedures. Thus, one may believe that in virtue of these complex, dynamic operations 
exteroceptive tactile space is presented as a spatial field. However, while by relying on 
kinesthetic information one may successfully grab objects without use of vision (Baud-Bovy 
& Vivani, 1998; Darling & Miller, 1993) or one can perceive spatial relationships between 
external object (Gepsthein & Banks, 2003), it seems that to account for such abilities it is 
enough to postulate some form of relational, egocentric or allocentric, spatial framework, and 
a reference to a genuine spatial field is not needed. For instance, grasping an object requires 
representing egocentric relations between an object and the body, as well as the various 
spatial relations between bodily parts needed for successful conduct of a proper movement. 
Similarly, to haptically assess distances between surfaces, a perceptual system needs to 
represent relations between body parts touching the considered surfaces. In both cases, there 
is no justification for introducing a topologically connected spatial field in addition to 
relational representations.    
However, one may argue that haptic exploratory procedures may, in fact, allow for 
representing space as having features typical for spatial fields.  For instance, by processing 
both cutaneous and kinesthetic information, in experiences such as Short or Long we are 
presented not only with some surfaces exerting pressure on the skin, but with an object 
extending in external space from one finger to another. In consequence, it seems that such 
experiences present a topologically connected, external spatial path between fingers. 
Similarly, when grabbing an item we may perceive that a fragment of the external space is 
empty, since the moving limb is meeting no resistance and that the fragment of space is 
topologically connected as a body part moves towards an item along a continuous path.  
28 
 
Nevertheless, while such examples may justify that by combining cutaneous and 
kinesthetic information external space is represented as topologically connected and empty, 
the second characteristic of spatial fields, relation independence, is not fulfilled. According to 
this characteristic, the topological structure of a spatial field remains the same despite changes 
in relational arrangements of elements presented with this space. However, in the case of 
haptic experiences using kinesthetic information, the presented structure of space supervenes 
on presenting particular relations between tactile objects and body parts. In other words, 
distinct haptic experiences can present space as having a distinct structure, such that this 
structure is determined by the presented relational pattern.  
For instance, when one grabs an object, a certain pattern of spatial relations between 
bodily parts is presented, and the occurrence of such patterns allows a certain continuous, 
empty spatial path P leading to an object to be presented. Nevertheless, if the object were to 
be grasped by a different bodily movement, a distinct spatial path P’ would be presented, 
determined by an alternative pattern of spatial relations. Similarly, if no grasping attempt was 
conducted, neither P nor P’ would be presented, as there would be no kinesthetic information 
regarding the space between the body and the object. In contrast to vision and interoceptive 
touch, there are no mechanisms which would allow the structure of space to be presented in a 
way that is unaffected by the occurrence of spatial relations concerning bodily parts and 
external objects. Hence, even when cutaneous information is combined with kinesthetic 
information, exteroceptive space of tactile objects does not have the character of a spatial 
field, as its presented topological structure is not independent of presented relations between 
objects and bodily parts.       
 




The space close to the bodily boundaries is likely to be represented in a distinct way in 
contrast to farther space (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Longo & Laurenco, 2006; Makin et al. 
2007). In particular, it has been established that there are multimodal neurons, activated by 
both visual and tactile stimuli, which are responsible for coding the presence of objects in the 
vicinity of the body (Cardinali et al., 2009; Fogassi et al., 1996; Ladavas, 2002). It may be 
proposed that such ‘peripersonal space’ is an exteroceptive spatial field in which tactile 
objects are presented to be located. For instance, distinct multimodal visuo-tactile neurons 
may code distinct fragments of the peripersonal space, such that as a result a topologically 
connected space around the body is represented. In consequence, the structure of the 
peripersonal space would be analogous to the structure skin-space with an exception that it is 
not restricted to a bodily surface but encompasses regions around body parts.  
In fact, there is an obvious sense in which objects presented in peripersonal space are 
presented as located in a spatial field. If peripersonal space is a multimodal visuo-tactile 
space, then objects presented as located in such a space are visually located in a fragment of 
the visual field. However, such an answer trivializes the question regarding the exteroceptive 
tactile field. It is obvious that for many objects it is possible to simultaneously touch and see 
them and so experience them as positioned within a spatial field. Nevertheless, in such cases 
the characteristics crucial for spatial fields are provided solely by the visual modality and so it 
is not justified to claim that experiences of joint touching and seeing an object provide reasons 
to postulate the presence of an exteroceptive tactile field. 
However, it may be claimed that peripersonal space is a genuinely tactile space which 
is shaped due to interactions with visual modality such that, at some stage of ontogenetic 
development, it acquires the characteristics of a spatial field. In this case the field-like 
characteristics would depend on visual modality only in a causal sense. Without vision, 
peripersonal space cannot acquire features of a spatial field, but after such acquisition, visual 
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input is no longer necessary, and a peripersonal spatial field is present due to the activities of 
tactile mechanisms. In fact, the presence of visual influences which modify tactile spatial 
representations is not implausible. For instance, it has been proposed that vision provides 
interoceptive bodily space with information regarding the size of bodily parts (de Vignemont, 
2014), and there are results suggesting that sighted people have greater tactile recognition of 
orientation-related properties, even when visual input is blocked (Gori et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, the main models of peripersonal space do not support this hypothesis as 
they suggest that peripersonal space is a relational space presenting objects as standing in 
egocentric relations to body parts, and not as positioned in a topologically connected spatial 
field. In particular, multimodal neurons coding peripersonal space are activated by changes in 
the distance of objects from the body and their velocity (Holmes & Spence, 2004; Fogassi et 
al., 1996). Hence, peripersonal space is usually characterized in terms of a relational, 
somatocentric reference frame in which objects are represented as positioned at some distance 
from a specific body part (Cardinali et al., 2009). Even if peripersonal space is sometimes 
described as a ‘field,’ it is not characterized as a spatial field, but as a field specifying 
relevance of actions aiming to create or avoid contact with the body (see Bufacchi and 
Iannetti, 2018). Explaining the ability to perform such actions may require complex 
representations utilizing egocentric frames of reference to be postulated (see Alsmith, 2017), 




Answering the question concerning the presence of tactile field requires distinguishing two 
forms of tactilely presented space: interoceptive space, in which tactile bodily sensations are 
experienced as located, and exteroceptive space, in which external tactile objects are 
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presented. I have argued that while interoceptive tactile space is presented as a spatial field, 
the same is not true of exteroceptive tactile space. Due to the functioning of bodily 
representations such as skin-space and the stable body schema, the interoceptive tactile space 
is presented as having crucial characteristics of spatial fields: it is topologically connected, 
relation independent, and it can contain empty places. It is not plausible to ascribe these 
characteristics to the exteroceptive tactile space. In particular, the exteroceptive tactile space 
is not relation independent: the way in which its topological structure is presented changes as 
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